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Abstract
Aboisso is a mid-sized city in the COte d'Ivoire where a remarkable sanitation
improvement took place between 1990 and 1997. The banks of the river, formerly used as
a dump, have been transformed into a public park, and public latrines have been built.
The public market is clean and well maintained, garbage is collected, streets are relatively
clean.
This thesis tells the story of how that city succeeded to overcome some common
problems of sanitation programs at the local level -- lack of public awareness and
demand, lack of financial means, and lack of local capacity. The municipality tackled the
problem of its sanitation with its own technical and financial departments. Strikingly, this
improvement took place during a period of particularly scarce resources.
The main story is composed of three interconnected stories describing the
circumstances under which this achievement was possible. The first one suggests that
linkages developed between the municipality and the communities were crucial to elicit
popular support for the sanitation program and to create over time a demand for related
services. The second story suggests that the lack of financial means necessitated an
incremental approach that turned out to be an efficient strategy. Energies and means were
focused citywide towards a single task at a time. The municipality started with the
transformation of the river into a park, and the construction of public latrines. This first
phase was focused, easy to do, visible and highly participatory. To have achieved rapidly
remarkable result helped the municipality to sustain the efforts in other components of the
program. As the third story suggests, this progressiveness also enabled the municipal
department to increase its capacity over time and, in parallel with an appropriate strategy,
to take advantage of complementary funding.
Beyond its specificities, the study of this case suggests that factors for success
belong to both political and managerial spheres, and are inseparably interconnected. It
questions the relevance of the dichotomy between demand-driven vs. supply-driven
programs in designing and implementing successful programs. Finally, the case of
Aboisso shows a possible first step towards the building of accountability mechanisms
between local governments and their constituents.
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Introduction: The Metamorphosis of Aboisso
In 1988, one of C6te d'Ivoire's major newspapers, Ivoir'Soir, published an article
depicting the city of Aboissol as one of the most unsanitary in the country. The article
described the banks of the river within the city as a dump used for personal and
community waste disposal. Garbage collection was badly organized; the public market
and the bus station were dirty and badly maintained.
In 1997, a television program 2 congratulated Aboisso for a remarkable
improvement in its environment. I visited the city in the summer 1997, and was struck
myself when I discovered a landscaped public park along the river. It was hard to imagine
that it had been a dump five years earlier! I questioned the walkers there, who explained
that it was the result of the action of the municipality 3. I visited the public latrines next to
the park; they were clean and well maintained. The municipal employee in charge asked
for my payment; the service is fee-based. Further along my promenade through the city, I
saw a truck collecting the garbage, which was gathered in a public bin on the roadside,
and I noticed that shrubbery had recently been trimmed in the public spaces. It was the
end of the day, the activity of the public market was slowing down, and several workers
were busy sweeping up the garbage and cleaning the aisles. I interviewed the sellers; they
were evidently satisfied with the service provided in exchange for their user-fees. The
agency in charge was, again, the municipality.
In addition to my own observation, I interviewed some inhabitants of the city who
confirmed that the situation had improved over the previous six years. Users of the public
latrines, sellers in the market, and walkers in the park were evidently satisfied with the
1 With its 23,000 inhabitants, Aboisso ranks 50th in population in the country. The city is located in the
South-Eastern part of the C6te d'Ivoire, on the road between Abidjan and Ghana.
2 "T616scopie d'une cit6" is a television program which presents a different city every month, interviewing
various people, to highlight what has been achieved by the municipalities since decentralization occurred in
CMte d'Ivoire in 1985.
3 In the course of this paper, I will use the word municipality to refer both to the territorial unit at the local
level ('La commune' in French), and to the administrative and political entity that administers it ('La
Mairie').
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change that had occurred. This is what represented "success" to me, and became the
entrance point of my research. This does not mean that the sanitation problem is solved
citywide. For instance, the sewers are open - their coverage is very costly - and the
municipality will need extra subsidies to address this major problem. Roads, except for
the main one, are not asphalted, and during the rainy season the soil that flows into the
sewers and remains stagnant is a serious sanitary problem. Nevertheless, a significant
improvement took place and, in my opinion, the conditions under which it happened
deserved to be studied.
The central concern of this thesis is to assess what happened in this city between
1987 and 1997 to bring about such an improvement. I was at first fascinated by the
unique set of circumstances that led to the success in Aboisso, which will be presented in
detail below. During the analysis of my research, I came to be fascinated also by the
general lessons that were to be drawn from this particular case. Undeniably, what
happened in Aboisso will never be exactly reproducible. Nevertheless, some "ingredients
for success," as I will argue, could be adapted to other contexts and other projects and, I
believe, could contribute to their successful implementation.
About Methodology
The methodological entrance point of this case study was to select a city where a
significant improvement had been achieved since decentralization occurred, and to try to
understand the circumstances that led to this "success." Success is defined empirically, in
terms of the outcome. The factors under consideration are the specific circumstances that
may explain why a particular municipality was more successful at delivering a service
than others. The most important factors are empirically defined, and do not correspond to
a predefined methodology. This approach has undeniable limitations, particularly for a
Master's thesis that does not allow the study of several cases that would cross-check
findings. Nevertheless, this approach does also enable the researcher to remain open
thoughout the research process to unexpected findings, and forces sensitivity to a broad
range of issues without being limited to the predefined hypothesis that would have been
anticipated from the literature or from preconceived explanations.
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This thesis is based on a field research that I conducted in Summer 1997. I spent
two months in the Cbte d'Ivoire, interviewing people and collecting data. The list of
interviews is presented in annex 2.
Research Questions
Common opinion in COte d'Ivoire, also held by international donors, is that the best
way to address the problems related to sanitation4 is to privatize the components on which
a user-fee can be applied, and to delegate to communities the responsibility of managing
non-excludable goods. As a consequence, several new kinds of institutional arrangements
are currently emerging throughout the country to address the issues of garbage collection,
maintenance and management of the public markets, and cleaning of public spaces.
Associations of youths and women, in particularly, are increasingly involved as service
providers.5 Private developers slowly discover how profitable it can be to manage public
markets, and politicians realize how convenient it is not to worry about daily
responsibility of such services. 6
This thesis tells the story of one case where some common problems of sanitation
programs at the local level -- lack of public awareness and demand, lack of financial
means, and lack of local capacity -- have been overcome. Contrary to the common
opinion in Cute d'Ivoire, this success did not involve either privatization or delegation to
communities. The municipality itself tackled the problem of its sanitation, with its own
technical and financial departments, and achieved remarkable results. Strikingly, this
improvement took place in a period of particularly scarce resources (the municipal budget
had dropped by 30% in 1991, when the program started).
The first set of research questions concerns building popular support for a sanitation
program, and forging over time a demand for related issues. A recurrent problem of
sanitation planning is the lack of public awareness of its benefits. So, too, is the lack of
4 In the context of this thesis, I make a clear distinction between two components of sanitation: public
cleanliness (garbage collection and disposal, open sewage, public space maintenance) and 'private'
sanitation (household's human excreta, waste water from kitchen and bathroom). The French language,
used in C6te d'Ivoire, makes a clear distinction between "la propret6 publique" (the public cleanliness), and
"l'assainissement" ('private' sanitation). My research deals with public cleanliness.
5 0. Boizo (1997)
6 0. Dembele and A. Fian (1997)
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communal willingness to address community-wide problems. 7 This is also generally true
in COte d'Ivoire, where public concern for sanitation is low. On the other hand, public
cleanliness became a major plank in the political platform of the elections in Aboisso in
1990, and it remains a priority citywide today. Moreover, the population seems to have
become aware of the relationship between preventive health and public cleanliness. How
was such awareness developed and diffused? What was the role played by the local
elections, given that the political campaign revolved around that issue? How was active
popular support built for a public good that is usually neglected? How did the top-down
approach end up forging a popular demand for better sanitation services?
The improvement was the result of the action of the municipality and its technical
department. What enabled the municipality to successfully tackle its sanitation problem,
though it had not done so in the past? How did it overcome the problem of the drastic
diminution of its revenues at the beginning of the program? This second set of questions
turns around the issue of the scope and the nature of the program, as well as the
incremental approach adopted for its implementation.
Finally, a third set of questions addresses the progressively improved performance
of the municipal departments. The budget of the technical department had dropped by
25% in 1991 as a consequence of the financial crisis. How did the technical department
overcome its lack of capacity, despite a decrease in its financial means? How did the
employees come to be motivated and dedicated to a service that may be perceived as
degrading to undertake? What is the role of the population in interacting with the field
workers? Finally, what is the role of the European grants that funded several projects in
the city?
Three interconnected stories suggest some answers to these questions. The first one
suggests that the linkages developed between the municipality and the communities were
important to elicit popular support for the sanitation program and to create a demand over
time for related services. The second story suggests that the lack of financial means
necessitated an incremental approach that turned out to be an efficient strategy. The
municipality started with the transformation of the river into a park, and the construction
7 D. Whittington, J. Davis, H. Miarsono and R. Pollard (1996)
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of public latrines. This first phase was focused, easy to do, visible and highly
participatory. To have achieved rapidly remarkable result helped the municipality to
sustain the efforts in other components of the program. As the third story suggests, this
progressiveness also enabled the municipal department to learn from its mistakes and,
together with an internal reorganization, to increase its capacity over time.
There may be other factors that also explain why Aboisso was successful at tackling
its sanitation. Nonetheless, I believe that the three stories presented here capture an
important part of what has been going on over the last decade in that city. I suggest that
these circumstances significantly contributed to the remarkable results achieved in that
city.
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Chapter 1: BuIlding Popular Support
Sanitation is not a major concern of the population in Cute d'Ivoire in general,
even though it is a recurrent problem in mid-sized cities throughout the country. It was a
serious problem in the city of Aboisso in the eighties, but in that city, public cleanliness
came to be the political platform of the elections in 1990. Today, sanitation upgrading
continues to be a priority citywide. Moreover, the constituent communities now demand
that the municipality provide complementary services, such as public latrines and public
showers.
While talking to people in Aboisso, I was struck by their awareness of the
importance of public cleanliness. During my stay in the city (one month in the summer
1997), I lived in the house of the Peace Corps volunteer, a simple apartment located in a
populated area. My next-door neighbors explained to me that the best way to avoid
malaria was to keep their courtyard clean and cut the shrubbery in front of their house.
That family gathered its garbage in a bin that they had bought from the municipality for
that use. Twice a week, the truck of the technical department would pass by and collect
these bins.
To link sanitation and health is not an obvious process. It requires the dissemination
of a message, sometimes long information campaigns, and still it often remains difficult
to sensitize people to the importance of sanitation. How had the population of Aboisso
come to incorporate and act on such a message? People would not remember exactly who
gave them for the first time such a message, but they would remember that it was related
to the electoral campaign for the elections of 1990. How had an electoral campaign been
transformed into an information campaign?
8 This is unanimously acknowledged as a major problem by the implementers of sanitation programs whom
I met in the country. Another evidence of this lack of demand is the survey conducted in C6te d'Ivoire by
Professors Manor and Crook: sanitation is not among the top ten preferences overall, and is only listed in
the 8th position for women. This survey was part of a large research program on decentralization.
See R. Crook and J. Manor (1994) - The case of the Cute d'Ivoire presented in Chapter 4, pp. 104-155
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This electoral campaign had four indirect consequences that are most important
from my perspective. First, the mayor established his credibility. Second, the
communities became aware of the importance of public cleanliness as a means of
preventing sickness. Third, existing community associations were reactivated, initially for
electoral purposes; they were mobilized before the election of the actual mayor, between
1985 and 1990, around the issue of cleaning the city, and came to actively support the
implementation of the program. A fourth byproduct of this electoral campaign, which is
crucial for the long-term success of the project, is the linkages that have been established
between the municipality and the population. These linkages are channels for the
transmission of information, both top-down and bottom-up, particularly through key-
persons within communities who were involved in the initial phase of electoral
mobilization.
These indirect consequences of the campaign are important to an understanding of
the civic dynamic of the city today, namely the capacity for popular mobilization that the
municipality has acquired. In addition, the population now ask for more services related
to sanitation, independently from the action of the municipality, which suggests an
autonomous demand that contributes to the sustainability of the sanitation program.
Having sketched the structure of the argument of this chapter, let me describe in
more detail what happened in Aboisso between the first local elections in 1985 and the
next in 1990, when the current mayor was elected.
The Electoral Campaign
Independent candidates were authorized to run in local elections in COte d'Ivoire
for the first time in 1985. This was a major change. During the previous thirty years of
single-party regime, the local official (the 'prefet' 9 under the centralized system, the
'mayor' since decentralization had taken place) was nominated by the central
government, that is by the party PDCI (Parti Democratique de Cote d'Ivoire). In1985, for
the first time, the politicians had to receive their legitimacy from popular vote, and by
1990 the multi-party system was authorized.
9 The "pr6fet" is the representative of the central administration at the local level.
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In 1985, the previous mayor, nominated in 1980 by the government, was re-elected.
The only opponent was an independent candidate, Mr. Elleighand, who was not very well
known by the population, though he was originally from the city. He had a pharmacy in
Abidjan, and had left Aboisso long ago. He had never been in politics before, but decided
to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the political decentralization. As many
observers emphasized, one of the main effects of organizing local elections is "to open
political opportunities to below" 10 , to allow the emergence of new types of personalities,
candidates more entrepreneurial and willing to use their popular legitimacy to be
independent from the patronage of the single party.
The Establishment of the Credibility of the Mayor.
Mr. Elleighand lost in the election in 1985. How did he win the next time? He had
to become known by the population in order to build electoral support. To do so, he had
to find ways to communicate with communities. He visited local communities repeatedly
between 1985 and 1990, talked to the residents, and listened to complaints. He asked
about their main concerns and needs, and often immediately provided a solution. Every
month he would go to a different neighborhood, where he asked either the chief of the
neighborhood, or another local leader, to invite people of the communities to come to a
meeting. A varying number of people attended these meetings. It was soon known that the
visitor used to give gifts to the communities. For example, he offered an electronic
amplifier to the Muslim community for the mosque. He brought the necessary materials
to finish painting two schools in other neighborhoods.
The gift of a new generator for the local hospital is still in the memory of everyone,
and is characteristic of the attitude of the future mayor towards the population. Two
critical needs had been repeatedly expressed. The first was for an antenna to enable the
city to get more television programs, the other was a new generator for the hospital. How
was this solved? It is hard to know with certitude, but I was told that he met with a group
of representatives of the communities, and discussed the situation. They unanimously
10 " Ouvrir le champs politique vers le bas", in S. Jaglin et Dubresson (1993). See also Y.-A. Faur6, (1991)
and T. Bakary (1986). These views are shared by local political leaders of the opposition, as I could
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agreed that the generator was more important. "He keeps his word" reflects his reputation
as established before the elections: it is the image that the population of Aboisso still has
of its mayor today. His popularity is so strong that quality products have come to be
called by his name. For example, the long-grain rice is called "rice Elleighand," while the
second quality bran rice is called by the name of the previous mayor.
This story is consistent with the analysis of electoral behavior in C6te d'Ivoire. The
first local democratic elections, which took place in 1985, demonstrated that throughout
the country the electorate is sensitive to the tangible realizations that the candidates have
brought to the community. Their credibility critically depends on concrete actions.
Consequently, the local elections have tended to favor "those candidates whose personal
achievement symbolizes best the economic and social success of the dominant class."' 1 In
Aboisso, the trust that people have in the mayor is still very much rooted in his electoral
campaign.
These ingredients are similar to those that lead to patronage and clientelistic politics
that benefit small groups of individuals. It does not seem to be the case in Aboisso. The
most important action undertaken by the municipality (the sanitation program) is a public
service. The first component was a non-excludable public good (the park), and no group
or particular area is excluded from the other services (the garbage collection). While
campaigning, Mr. Elleighand sought support from certain categories of people,
representative of some particular groups, rather than focusing on individuals. He
implements certain measures or policies which assist those groups which, in turn, support
him politically. The following section illustrates this point in the case of Aboisso: how
the candidate specifically sought the political support of the associations of women and
youth, how he used some key-persons as intermediaries and mobilized around the issue of
sanitation.
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understand from the several discussions I had with H. Memel-Fotd, one of the intellectual leaders of the
principal party of opposition in Cote d'Ivoire, and a noted anthropologist.
" T. Bakary (1986)
Dissemination of a Message and the Forging of a Demand
Civil society in C6te d'Ivoire is relatively weak after thirty years of an authoritarian
regime.12 The community associations which are potentially most active in the area of
urban management are generally the 'Associations of Women', and that of 'Youth'.13
This is also true for Aboisso.14
In 1985, Mr. Elleinghand needed support for his campaign. He had a vision of
cleaning the city, and transforming the banks of the river into a public park. Where could
he find support? Aboisso is a city located in the Akan kingdom, and the local ethnic
group is matrilineal, which means that women play an important role socially in addition
to the familial one. In addition, the nature of his program was likely to elicit interest from
women. Women are the daily users of the public market; they take care of the children,
who suffer often from sickness due to lack of hygiene; they are more concerned with the
cleanliness of their households than are their husbands, who work either in the plantations
or in the administration or in education. Mr. Elleinghand then looked for influential
people in the female communities, more or less involved in collective activities.15
Marianne is typical of these intermediaries who play an important role in this story.
She is a seller of fresh meat in the public market. A Muslim, she originates from
Mauritania.16 She has fourteen children whose ages range from ten to thirty years old. She
is remarkably intelligent, despite her low education. Mr. E. came to visit her in 1985,
before she had heard of him. She was involved in the 'Association of the Ivoirian
Women,' which was at the time not very active. He explained his program and his vision
for the city, how important it was to clean the city as a means for preventive health.
12 Scholars have argued that the very weakness of the Ivoirian civil society enabled the central government
to develop a certain level of independence from pressure groups, which, coupled with the technocratic
capacity of the public service and the discipline imposed by the President, is one of the factors explaining
the long political stability of the regime. See R. Crook (1991)
1 Attahi (1995), Dembele and Fian (1997)
14 A Peace Corps volunteer was at the time of my field research in charge of helping community
organization in Aboisso. She was deploring that for more than one year she had been searching for other
"community-based" and "grass-roots associations", without much success.
15 A similar story could be told about the Youth association, which the candidate (later the newly elected
mayor), contributed to reactivate, initially with an electoral purpose. These two associations (youth and
women) are the ones which are active in the cleaning of the city. The other associations in the city may have
played a role at the electoral level, and may be active in other activities, but this has not been a focus of my
research.
16 The number of foreigners is huge in CMte d'Ivoire: 40% of the total population.
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"Public cleanliness is the first medication," he said. "Health depends on hygiene, hygiene
depends on public cleanliness." Since he is a pharmacist, she believed what he said. She
introduced him to the chief of the Muslim community, who organized a meeting with the
community at large. Mr. Elleinghand inquired about their main needs, and offered an
electronic amplifier to the mosque soon after that first meeting. Marianne came to think
he was different from the other political officials. "He wants to get things done;" "He
keeps his word," "He works," became his reputation. Marianne trusted him and believed
he would give the city what it needed. She realized how important sanitation is.
Influential among her community,' 7 everybody knows her, and she knows everybody. Mr.
Elleinghand asked in 1986 for her support and her help in running in the 1990 elections.
She mobilized people, she disseminated the message about cleanliness. She actively
participated in reorganizing the women's associations. "Aboisso had become too big, we
needed several associations, one per neighborhood." She became the representative of the
"Association of the Women of the Neighborhood T. P."
After the elections, the mayor called together the women of the city. He thanked
everyone for his support, and explained what he wanted to do. The first action would be
moving in to the new public market, which was to be finished soon. The second action
would be cleaning the river and transforming it in a public park. He would need the active
support of the women to help the municipality to prepare the field. He announced a
coming week end when everybody would be required to come to clean the banks of the
river. He invited all the women to visit the town hall, where he showed them what the
previous mayor had left (the offices were badly maintained, the trucks for collecting the
garbage were deteriorated). He drove them to Abidjan, to show his private house. "He is
already rich, he is not hungry anymore, he will not eat from us." He warned that things
would take time, but if women were to help the municipality, things would be better soon.
This story is compiled from the various discussions I had with people in Aboisso. I
interviewed people from various conditions, and in various contexts in order to cross
check the stories that I was told. I do not pretend to present all the facts, but I believe I
17 She has been a member of the Women's Association since 1981. She is a member of the selection
committee for the micro-credit project implemented by the Canadian cooperation. She also used to be a
member of the "Woman of the Parti D6mocratique de C6te d'Ivoire."
Page 18
have reflected a prevalent perception of how things happened, which captures a certain
truth. It shows how a message was spread throughout the communities during the
electoral campaign, and how existing associations were reactivated and middle-level
leaders empowered to take a public role within communities. It also shows how the
population came to be mobilized around the problem of the cleanliness of the city, so that
a new mayor was elected on this platform.18
Linkages between the municipality and the communities
The electoral campaign reactivated existing associations. After the elections, the
new municipality promoted new community organizations, which have yet to prove their
long-term value to the city, but which nonetheless play a useful role in transmitting
information between the municipality and the communities. A new public market had
been built by the previous mayor, financed by USAID. Traditionally, people sell specific
products, such as bananas, atiek6, fresh fish, smoked fish, etc. A seller of vegetables does
not sell meat, or fish. A seller of smoked meat does not sell fresh meat. The technical
department 19 asked the venders to designate one representative per product, who would
be the interlocutor of the municipality during the move in. Marianne is the representative
for the sellers of fresh meat. When I went to the market, I was introduced to all these
"representatives" whom I wanted to interview. I got lost, and asked a seller of vegetables
where the representative of the vegetables sellers was sitting. The first person could not
tell me. The second could not either. Finally, the third one told me: "there is no such
representative!".
It appears that some people function as intermediaries between the municipality and
the sellers, without being perceived as representatives by all of the people they are
supposed to represent. Nevertheless, those people play two important roles: the
dissemination and the collection of the information needed by the municipality, and the
mobilization of the population of the market. This way of organizing is very top-down,
1 It is interesting to note that the two other candidates for the election of 1990, one being the previous
mayor, also campaigned around that theme.
19 The employee in charge emphasized that it was an idea of the new mayor.
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and remains far from the ideal that we can have of a grass root, spontaneous, and
democratic community organization.
To summarize, the assets that the newly elected municipality capitalized on at the
time of starting its action were his own credibility, the popular support for a sanitation
program, and the linkages with the communities. Through these means, a demand for
sanitation services came to be forged during the electoral campaign. These assets are also
important in explaining the successful implementation of the program, to which I turn in
the following chapter.
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Chapter 2: Adopting an Incremental Approach
This second part of the story starts in early 1991, right after the elections. The
municipal team recently elected had now to meet its electoral promises, including to
tackle the sanitation problems of Aboisso. There were many things to do (cleaning the
river, collecting the garbage, covering the sewers, sweeping the streets, building public
latrines, etc), all with severely restricted resources (technical, human and financial).
The scarcity of resources
The country was entering a deep financial crisis, due to the accumulation of foreign
debt coupled with a drop in the international price of coffee and cocoa, the major export
commodities. The central government was almost bankrupt, and could not afford to pay
its share of the budget of the municipalities. As a consequence of this, the budget of the
municipality of Aboisso dropped dramatically (more than 30%) in 1991 and 1992.
How do you implement an ambitious program when your resources have just
dropped drastically? In Aboisso, the strategy was to adopt an incremental approach,
adapting the scope and the sequence of implementation to the existing resources
(financial, human and technical). The municipality started with a limited number of
projects, affordable within its own budget, relatively easy to do, and highly visible: the
transformation of the river into a public park and the building of public latrines.
Successfully and rapidly achieving completion of a visible project enabled the
municipality to sustain its efforts in the other components of the program. It also helped
the mayor to gain complementary funding (European grants). Finally, the incremental
approach facilitated a learning-by-doing process for the municipal departments.
Given the municipal budget in 1991, it was out of the question to initiate several
projects at the same time. The budget for investment dropped by almost 70% in 1991, and
only recovered in 1994 with the European grants. The working budget of the municipal
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department dropped by 25%, and has remained relatively constant (+/- 15%) since then.
The share of the investments dedicated to the issue of cleanliness has strongly increased
since the elections in 1990.20
The municipality still regrets that it was not able to initiate more projects in parallel.
The electoral campaign had put so much emphasis on sanitation issues that they had to
tackle this issue in priority. The lack of resources forced them to set clear political
priorities, to focus their energies towards a single program and, within this program,
towards a limited number of projects.
A Unintentional but Wise Strategy
A crucial sanitary problem was the river in the center of the city used as a regular
site for defecation and waste disposal. The mayor had promoted his vision of the river
bank as a park during the electoral campaign. Not only did he want to clean up the banks,
he also wanted to replace the existing dump with a public park. To achieve this
transformation was financially feasible, especially if people were to participate in
providing free labor to clean up the banks. The park would benefit the whole population,
and the only potential opponents (seven informal chicken and palm wine sellers) could be
relocated in the new public market which had just been built. The challenge was to
mobilize the population around a public good, and to change the behavior of those people
who misused the river. The potential for active popular participation had been created
during the electoral campaign, as was shown in the previous chapter. With respect to the
sanitation habits of the people, a necessary prerequisite was to offer a realistic alternative,
particularly to the poor. The 'carrot and stick' strategy of Aboisso was to build two blocks
of public latrines, and to organize the policing of the park to force a change a behavioral
change.
Although no assessment of the demand was made, the public latrines built in
Aboisso avoid the common flaws of such facilities, such as lack of privacy, convenience
20 I based my analysis on the cross-checking of data found in the municipality and in the 'Direction
G6ndrale des Collectivit6s Territoriales,' the department of the Ministry of Interior which is responsible for
the approval and supervision of the annual budgets of the municipalities. See the annex 1 for the evolution
of the municipal budget between 1990 and 1997.
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and cleanness. This may explain why they are very much used and appreciated. The two
blocks of ten latrines are remarkably well maintained. I used to go there every day, since
they were much cleaner than most of the private restrooms in the offices throughout the
city. They are managed by the financial department of the municipality. Two employees
work there 12 hours a day. They collect the fee of 10 CFA for urinating, 25 CFA for
defecating (the minimum salary is 45,000 CFA/month), and clean the facilities. Users do
not complain about the price, so it seems to be affordable. I observed that the people who
did not want to pay went further along the river. I assume this is the case for most of the
poorest; at least it presents less of a sanitary problem than when it occurs in the center of
the city. Women are particularly satisfied with having such a service, and the latrines
close to the public market are intensively used.
The approach adopted by the municipality had some elements of a typical top-down
and 'supply-driven' approach. The population did not participate in the design,
implementation or maintenance of the facility. Nonetheless, the alternative provided
appeared to be responsive to the needs of the users. On the other hand, popular
participation was elicited for the cleaning of the river, which may have contributed to the
willingness to change the behavior. Although no demand had been explicitly expressed
for latrines before the implementation of the project, there is now a clear demand for
more public latrines and even for public showers, which has been directly and repeatedly
expressed to the municipal councilors by the inhabitants. As a direct consequence, three
new blocs were under construction at the time of my field research in 1997.
The lack of resources made free labor particularly valuable. The cleaning of the
river was an easy task which could be accomplished by the population. The mayor had
explained during his pre-election meetings that he would need active help to get things
done. As Marianne stated "he helped us, now we will help him."2 2 He prepared for the
event by visiting the communities during the first year after his election, explaining again
and again his plans for the city, particularly for the river. In early March, 1992, the head
of the technical department went all over the city, with a loudspeaker in his car and
21 Whittington (1993).
22 She was referring to the generator that he offered to the hospital.
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escorted by drums and 'griots. 23He called on people to come the following week-end to
help clean up the river. In addition, radio messages were aired in the local languages. The
municipality invited the various civic associations of youths, women and neighborhoods.
"Everybody came," people said when I asked them. This is difficult to establish
with certainty, but everybody told me that everybody came! This reflects the atmosphere
that was created, and the municipality's capacity to mobilize the populace in handling the
problem of public cleanliness.
The strong popular participation had another side effect which may have
contributed to the success of the program. Although these effects are difficult to assess, I
believe that this active participation contributed to the "ownership" feeling of the park,
which in turn contributed to the sustainable change in the behavior of the people. 4 Hence
those who participated in the clean up are now pressuring those who might be tempted to
backslide. These people are also pressuring the municipal workers for good maintenance
and policing.
This first phase was technically simple to accomplish. There were no land property
problems, so there were no problems of expropriation. The only problem was the
relocation of the informal sellers who had settled along the river. The municipal
employees visited them, explained the project, and offered a place in the new public
market. The sellers were happy to move to a more convenient facility within the
commercial heart of the city. Once this problem was solved, the project was simply to
clean the place, to renovate the sidewalks, and to plant flowers!
This first phase was also politically easy. There were no conflicting interests. The
park is a public good, and the whole city benefits from it. The only potential opponents
are people who refuse to change their behavior; they are poor people who are not
politically organized. They are passive opponents, in the sense that they cannot prevent
the project from being realized; they can only resist the change by continuing using the
23 A "griot" is a traditional organizer of events in West Africa. These people belong to a special social
group, they are called for organizing concerts, dance events, etc.
2 See J. Montgomery, "When Participation helps", in Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 3,
N*1, 1983
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river as they always have.2s They can still use the river as they wish, but further along, not
in the center of the city.
The simplicity of the first phase led to its rapid implementation. The mayor took
charge of the municipality early in 1991. The latrines were built during that same year,
and the park was inaugurated in the summer of 1992.
Lastly, this first phase of the program was highly visible. I was very impressed to
discover such an attractive public park in a small city in the African countryside. My
attention was first attracted when I was traveling along the road between Abidjan and
Ghana. The park is amazingly well maintained, and the population is very proud of it. It is
hard to imagine that the river used to be a sewer. It contributes significantly to changing
the image of the city, both for insiders and outsiders.
To summarize, I have argued above that, given the scarcity of resources, the
municipality had to set clear political priorities and to start with a single program,
progressively implemented. It did so with a first phase that was:
" coherent and realistic (the "carrot and stick")
" non-excludable, then broadly supported,
" participatory, in some aspects,
" technically and politically easy,
" highly visible, and
* rapidly implemented.
It was not entirely an intentional strategy. The municipality still regrets that it was
not able to initiate more projects in parallel, due to the lack of money. If it seems that I
am arguing that the lack of resources is an ingredient for success, this is not the case.
What is true is that the municipality reacted to the strong financial constraints with
intelligence, choosing the right project, starting with the right initial phase. Certainly, the
scarcity of resources imposed an incremental approach. This also proved to be a wise
strategy, which may provide a lesson for others.
To have achieved remarkable results successfully and rapidly affirmed the
credibility of the leadership and enabled the municipality to sustain its efforts in
25 Actually some do, and the park needs to be watched 24 hours a day.
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accomplishing the other components of the program, particularly the garbage collection. I
will now turn to the changes that took place within the technical department, enabling it
to carry out its responsibilities more effectively.
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Chapter 3: Improvin2 the Performance of the Municipal Department
This part of the story also begins in early 1991. 26 The new municipality had been
elected. The whole department knew the new mayor, and his program for cleaning up the
city. What would he do? The new public market, financed by USAID, was almost
finished, sellers waiting to move in. Only one garbage truck was still working. For several
months, all the employees had been waiting for the results of the elections, and therefore
had not been working much. The technical department had no head, although the new one
was supposed to have arrived one year ago. 27 The former mayor was not demanding, he
did not concern himself with garbage collection, as long as there were no serious
problems. The population did not seem to care much either, so why worry?
Since 1991, the municipal departments have been doing their jobs better and better.
I take as one indicator of this change the improved cleanliness of the city. The garbage is
now collected and the market is clean. The sewers are maintained. Illegal disposal of oil
are quite rare. The municipal employees are in charge of new tasks, which are well
performed; the park is clean, policed and maintained, the public latrines are remarkably
clean. User-fees for both the latrines and the market are collected at the excellent rate of
recovery of more than 95%, according to the head of the financial department.
26 I would have liked to start it earlier, but it was difficult to check the information related to the period
before 1990. Few employees of that period were still working in the technical department, and they told me
contradictory things. Therefore, I could not assess with certainty in what ways the department was
functioning differently before 1990. The answers varied from: "nothing is different" to "everything has
changed." The factual answers that I received when trying to go beyond these statements were just as
contradictory.
27 An administrative deconcentration occurred in parallel to the political decentralization. The head of the
local administration, as well as the heads of the technical, financial and administrative municipal
departments are civil servants nominated by the central government. These bureaucrats change every four
years. Sometimes the replacement is delayed. The public servants are functionally accountable to the
mayor. These mixed arrangements, that go beyond the dichotomy centralized/decentralized, work quite well
in Cte d'Ivoire, and few problems have arisen (See K. Attahi, 1990).
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Several factors may account for the change. It is precisely their combination that led
over time and through an incremental process, to an improvement of the outputs of these
departments. Let me emphasize here that I take as the indicator of the "success" the
results in the field. These results are not only due to an improvement in the performance
of the department stricto sensu, but also to the strategy used to elicit a change in the
habits of the population (a stick and carrot strategy). In other words, the department is
doing the "right" things in the "right" way, and this "right" strategy accounts for the good
results as much as does the improved performance of the employees.
An Effective Strategy
The sanitation program utilized two features that turned out to be effective: the
incremental approach enabled the progressive building of local capacity and the joint use
of a "carrot" and a "stick" encouraged the change in the behavior of the population.
The previous chapter shows why the progressive implementation was a good
strategy with respect to the first phase (coherent and realistic, easy to do, rapidly
implemented, participatory and visible). This progressiveness also gave the municipal
department time to learn from its mistakes. In addition, it forced the municipality to
clearly set its priorities, which directed the citywide energies towards one objective at a
time. To focus on one task helps to overcome the lack of material and of human
resources. Once a result is achieved, the department can tackle the next problem. With
respect to the sanitation program, the following priorities were established: 28
1. the park and the public latrines (realized in 1991-92)
2. the garbage collection, first in the market and secondly citywide (ongoing)
3. the better maintenance of the sewers, and ultimately their coverage (not yet tackled)
The first phase of the program led to rapid results. The park and the public latrines
were realized within a year and a half after the elections. During that period, not much
was done in terms of reorganizing garbage collection. The technical department
performed these tasks as usual, without changing its method fundamentally. In 1993, after
the park and the latrines were built, the municipality sought additional funding to buy
28 Again, it is difficult to know what was intentional and what was contingent.
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new equipment. They made a request to the American Embassy to have the help of two
Peace Corps volunteers, including an engineer specialized in sanitation.
The direct positive effect of this incremental approach was that it gave time to the
municipal department to learn from its mistakes. For example, in 1993 the municipality
bought 50 new public bins to install throughout the center of the city. The mayor had seen
a model in Belgium, which they decided to buy. It turned out that the model could not
endure the vigorous handling by the workers. "It was attractive but too sophisticated for
Africa," as the person in charge told me. In 1996, USAID offered 150 bins, which were
tested for six months. 1600 additional bins will be delivered in case of satisfaction. "This
time we chose a very simple model," said the head of the department, "durability is the
most important criteria."
Another important feature of the strategy used was the joint use of a carrot and a
stick to encourage a change in the behavior of the population. The habits of the
population in Aboisso were an integral part of the sanitation problem of the city. To
change any habit is a long and slow process. Getting out the message about the
importance of cleanliness was a first step towards change, and the mayor achieved this
result through getting support from community groups. To provide a reasonable
alternative, such as the public latrines, or bins in the various neighborhoods is also key.
The park is a pleasure for many people, without excluding any inhabitant. These were the
"carrot" side of the strategy.
In parallel, the municipality uses efficient "sticks" to prevent misbehavior. The park
is patrolled 24 hours a day. A guard in uniform walks around and reprimands those
people who still want to wash themselves in the river. According to one guard, this
happens less and less, but some people are very reluctant to change their habits,
particularly the old people. Another very efficient "stick," introduced more recently, is the
hygiene agent. Three people were hired in 1995 to watch the misbehavior of the
population and to report on it. One of them is in charge of the public market, another
watches the commercial center of the city, and the third one goes every day to a different
neighborhood. Three of them cover the territory of the city. They each report their
observations in a notebook, which is countersigned every night by the head of the
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technical department. When there are infractions, the municipality meets with the family
and explains what the problem is. For example, when a household does not mow the wild
grass in front of its house, or when a private water closet flows into the sewer, the family
is summoned to the technical department. At the time of my field research, the municipal
council had just approved a decision to give the technical department the right to fine
anyone guilty of misbehavior the equivalent of $US4, which is relatively high. In addition
to this 'police' role, the hygiene agents are in charge of explaining 'good behavior,'
including how to use the public bins, when to put them in the street so that the truck can
collect the garbage, how to build a better water closet.
The Symbolic Role of the Mayor
An important role played by the mayor is that of motivating the employees in an
occupation usually perceived as degrading. By showing his own dedication to sanitation,
he improved the status of all the sanitation workers. The symbolic role of the leader was
crucial to initiate and channel the energy for change, and to overcome the resistance to
it,29 particularly relevant in this African culture, where the representation of power tends
to be personalized in the chief.
Given this symbolic power, how did the mayor concretely come to create a sense of
mission among the municipal employees? After the elections, he invited the department
employees to several meetings where he explained his intention to clean the city, and
asked for the help of all the employees. He asked for concrete suggestions about what to
do and how to do it. It was the first time that such a cooperative approach was adopted by
a mayor. The employees who were present at that time told me of how impressed they
had been. The mayor explained that the municipality had to deal with diminishing
revenues due to the financial crisis at the national level. Consequently, they would have to
start with a limited number of projects; the rest would come later. The priority was to
clean the river and to build two blocks of latrines, one next to the river, the other next to
the public market.
29 Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) - Hirschman (1971).
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After the beginning of the sanitation program, he spent a lot of time walking in the
city and talking to people in the streets. He encouraged the field workers, checked if the
work had been well done, talked again and again about the importance of public
cleanliness. This behavior undeniably contributed to motivating the workers. A hygiene
agent strongly expressed his dedication: "We are not animals anymore. I will teach these
women to behave well." 30 This young man was really convinced that he had a mission
somehow to 'educate' the population. When I inquired about the source of his sense of
mission, he told me simply, "Mr. Mayor told me it was important." The mayor once came
to talk to him personally, and he felt rewarded to such an extent that his job seems now to
be his calling.
This demonstrates how the mayor motivated the workers to do their job better. The
next section will describe the internal reorganizations that have taken place over time in
the technical department and have led to better outcomes of the department as a whole.
Better Definition of the Tasks
From mid-1990 to mid-1991, the department had been without a head. There was
no leadership during that period though the draught man took charge of the day-to-day
tasks of management. 31 The first change occurred in mid-1991, when the new chief of the
department, designated by the Ministry of Interior, finally arrived. He took charge with a
clear mission assigned by the mayor,32 to clean the city and, to start with, to clean the
river. Independently of the personal qualities of this chief, however, the department was
likely to perform better than without leadership at all.
The head of the technical department was given a clear mission, for which he would
be held responsible. This is the line followed by subsequent internal reforms undertaken
in the department, with regards to tasks like the garbage collection. Progressively, the
tasks to be performed were identified systematically, a team assigned to each of them
30 He was referring to the sellers in the market. Some, particularly those coming from the surrounding
villages, refuse to use the public latrines, and he has to reprimand them, sometimes aggressively.
31 He will be promoted to assistant of the head of the department as a reward for his action during that
vacancy period.
32 The mayor is the functional head of the municipal administration, even if the heads of the main
departments are civil servants appointed by the Ministry of Interior.
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with a designated team supervisor, who would be held responsible for the results. This
process is still ongoing in 1997. A map of the routes for the garbage trucks now exists in
the technical department. Everyday, each team knows what to do, in which neighborhood,
through which streets. The schedules for the trucks have also been systematized. The
person in charge of one of the teams is a former employee of the administrative
department. He said he was assigned to the technical department "to be the eyes and the
ears of the municipality," and to ensure that "the job is well done." He could tell me
precisely the tasks for which he and his team were responsible. He knew he would be
held directly responsible if the garbage of this particular neighborhood was not collected
on Tuesdays and Fridays. He had to supervise the work of two teams with five
fieldworkers each. He would therefore make sure the job got done.
In 1994, the municipality decided to tackle more systematically the problem of the
garbage collection. They negotiated with the European Union a new truck, the repair of
existing material, as well as the building of two waste disposal sites outside the city. They
asked the American Embassy to provide the support of the Peace Corps, preferably an
engineer in sanitation. A Peace Corps volunteer was assigned in Aboisso with the mission
of improving the process of collecting garbage in the city. He arrived in late 1995 and
played an important role in eliciting the reforms and implementing them.
Expectations of the Population
The inhabitants of Aboisso really love the park. They use it a lot. They are very
proud of the change that took place in their city. "We have to thank the new mayor," they
say. These people actively support the guards in their job, even helping to keep watch for
them; "quelqu'un fait caca de l'autre c6t6 "33 They congratulate the gardener ("he is
wonderful").
The demand of the population is even more evident with regard to the fee-based
services. In both the latrines and the public market, there is today a high level of
expectations from the users. "I pay my tax, I then deserve a clean market," together with
"it is normal that I pay my taxes, given that the municipality has to pay those guys who
33 "Someone is defecating on the other side of the park."
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clean the market." I came to understand from my repeated discussions that users are
satisfied with the services. The expression of this satisfaction in turn is an incentive for
the workers to do a good job.
The people who have been active in the electoral campaign and in the cleaning of
the river are particularly encouraging to the workers. They feel this program is somehow
their program. Marianne would always tell the hygiene agent about the infractions that
she observes during the day. A walker in the park told me, "I cleaned it once, I don't want
to do it again, the guardian has to do his job." He was critical because he had once seen
the guard asleep. These people contribute to the dynamism of the technical department in
expressing their satisfaction for the job well done and though their pressure on the part of
the population reluctant to make an effort towards better sanitation. Allah Tanoh, the
representative of another neighborhood and a seller of smoked fish, often berates her
colleagues who do not respect the cleanliness of the market. The new president of the
Youth Association also organized an educational session around the issue of public
cleanliness.
Nevertheless, some people are very reluctant to change their habits. The park needs
to be watched twenty four hours a day. A vender once hurt with a knife the hygiene agent
who was trying to forbid her from defecating in the sewer. There is also another 'side of
the coin' with regard to user fees. In the market for example, some venders throw away
their waste in front of the cleaners, right after they have swept: "I pay my tax. I then have
the right to dirty. They are paid for cleaning."
This shows how contradictory are the pressures expressed by the population on the
fieldworkers. The population is not uniform in terms of its response to the reforms but,
overall, the response tends to be positive. To what extend it is sustainable, and whether it
would last if this mayor were to leave the city, is hard to say. I would think that if things
were to degrade again, another political candidate would sooner or later campaign around
this issue, building on this experience. In this respect, I think the achievements are stable
for the long-run.
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Internationalfunding
The European Union project called "Projet de Developpement des C6tibres"
(Project for the Development of the Coastal Cities) covers the 16 mid-sized cities of the
South of the C6te d'Ivoire. These municipalities did not need to apply for these grants,
but they negotiated the concrete projects to be funded by the program. This is a successful
example of decentralized cooperation. The general objective of the project is to support
the decentralization process, with an intentional emphasis on:
1. improvement of environmental
2. increase in local capacity
3. local economic development, with particular support to local private sector
The budget allocated to the city of Aboisso represents 500 Mio CFA to be spent over five
years (1994-98).34 This amounts to two and a half times the total average annual budget
of the city.
The projects financed by the European Community in Aboisso, and implemented
locally by the municipality itself, are the following:35
" related to sanitation: a more sophisticated layout for the park, two other blocks of
public latrines (one in the trucks station and one in a school), two dumps for waste
disposal, a new truck for the garbage collection, the paving of the station and of the
public market
* additional kiosks and extension of the public market
e rehabilitation of primary schools
e extension of the cultural center
Some features of this European project supported and reinforced the approach
initiated by the municipality of Aboisso: the grants came at the "right" time, emphasizing
the "right" issue and favoring the "right" kind of projects. The project was designed
between 1991 and 1993, in close collaboration of the consultants hired by the European
34 See annex 1.
35 In addition to these projects implemented by the municipality itself, the following projects are being
undertaken by a central government agency specialized in public works on behalf of the city of Aboisso in
1997-98:
* equipment of a rural clinic and of a maternity clinic
* equipment of the morgue
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Community with the municipalities, in order to take into account the local contexts and
their particularities. The representative of the European Community is particularly
satisfied with the cooperative attitude of the municipality of Aboisso. 36 The first payment
was made in 1994, and funded the improvement of the lay out of the park. The following
payment in 1995 covered the other improvements related to sanitation. In 1996-97, the
municipality started the building of the primary school, the health center and the cultural
center.
The PDCC emphasized environmental issues. Therefore, the priorities established
by the municipality were not contrary but were, in fact, reinforced by the European
project. Finally, "given its small budget," the PDCC favors small scale projects, which
the technical department was therefore capable of implementing. 37
To summarize, the combination of the following factors led over time and through
an incremental process to an improvement of the outputs of the municipal departments:
9 the municipality adopted an effective strategy for implementing the program (its
progressiveness and the joint use of "stick and carrot" to elicit a change in the
population habits);
9 the symbolic role of a mayor politically committed to the project (his strong dedication
motivated the employees);
* a set of internal micro-management reorganizations (a clearer definition of the tasks
enabled a better supervision of the outcomes);
* new expectations expressed by the population;
* additional funding that came progressively with an emphasis on the appropriate scope,
scale and nature of projects, reinforcing the learning process.
I now turn to the concluding chapter, and show how this case study relates to the
more general debates in the literature on decentralization and its implications for service
delivery.
* footbridge across the river
36 The person in charge of the implementation of the whole project insisted on the "creativity" of the actions
undertaken, as well as the "sensible" and "wise" solutions adopted.
37 See the project evaluation report, Groupe Huit (1995).
Page 35
Page 36
Conclusion
Aboisso is a case of successful service delivery at the local level. A remarkable
sanitation improvement took place in that city between 1990 and 1997, as the result of the
action of the new municipality. The banks of the river, previously used as a dump, were
transformed into a landscaped public park. The public market and the new public latrines
were well maintained. Garbage was collected. The municipal council was re-elected in
1995 on basis of this good performance.
The "success" took place after a period of fundamental institutional reforms in the
C6te d'Ivoire.38 Major political reforms included the organization in 1985 of the first
local elections and the authorization in 1990 of multi-partyism. Administrative and fiscal
reforms enabled the formerly highly centralized Ivoirian government to devolve
significant responsibility and resources to the local level.39 Evaluations of C0te d'Ivoire's
decentralization experience are mixed.40 There has been significant criticisms of the
institutional and political reforms, many of which appear well grounded.4 1 Nevertheless,
the case of Aboisso suggests that there are circumstances under which an undeniable
improvement in urban governance can emerge from these reforms. This thesis
highlighted some factors that favored the emergence of these circumstances.
These factors are both managerial and political and are inseparably interconnected.
Administrative performance improved because clear political priorities were set, political
commitment motivated employees, and electoral mobilization of communities supported
38 Literature about the democratization process ongoing in the C6te d'Ivoire is abundant. Some important
examples include Faur6 (1985, 1991), Bakary (1986), Bayart (1986, 1991), Crook (1991), Medart (1991).
3 The decentralization process ongoing at the administrative and fiscal level has also led to abundant
writing. See Adamolekun (1996 ), Attahi (1991, 1995), Bakary (1986), Crook (1991, 1996), Crook and
Manor (1994), Dubresson (1996), Oulaye (1995).
40 Crook and Manor (1994), Crook (1996), Stren, Halfani, and Attahi (1993)
4' Hilldebrand (1996), Bakary (1986), Crook (1996,1997), Faur6 (1991)
4 My research did not focus on this, but tax collection and other municipal management issues, such as
delivery of administrative services, have also been improved over the last seven years. Aboisso can more
generally be considered as a case of improved urban governance, defined both in terms of its output to the
population and of its financial management.
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the implementation of the program. A thorough understanding of the conditions that led
to the success ought to take into account this interconnectedness, which tends to be
underestimated in the literature. The way a demand for the sanitation program was
nurtured also challenges the controversial literature related to supply-driven vs. demand-
driven programs. This dichotomy proved to be irrelevant to capture the iterative process
by which popular support for the sanitation program was created in Aboisso. Finally,
essential ingredients of the success are the linkages that had been established between the
municipality and the communities during the electoral campaign. I suggest that these
linkages are a first step towards developing a genuine accountability mechanism, which
the literature unanimously acknowledges as being essential for successful
decentralization.
Interconnectedness of political and managerial factors for success
The institutional approach to decentralization focuses on the incentives that derive
from the characteristics of different public goods and services. Although this school
recurrently presents "lack of political commitment" and "resistance to change" as causes
of failure, its literature tends to underestimate the role of politics. Political underpinnings
of the decisions are acknowledged, but the implicit assumption is that local officials are
accountable to a representative proportion of their constituents. This literature tends to
dissociate managerial from political aspects of urban governance. 43 From this perspective,
the objective of decentralization is "not strong local government, but an efficient and
responsive system of service delivery." 44 Taking political conditions for granted, the
recommendations for improving service delivery in this literature are essentially
institutional in nature.
On the other hand, literature on political decentralization presumes that if the
organization of local elections is a necessary condition for democratization, it is not a
sufficient one.45 Moreover, elections are not a sufficient condition for improved
43 Orstom, Schroeder and Wynne (1989, 1993), Wunsch (1991), Wunsch and Olowu (1990), Silverman
(1992), Israel (1987) Olowu (1987), Rondinelli (1981), Rondinelli and Cheema (1983), Rondinelli, Nellis
and Cheema (1984).
44 Dillinger (1994).
4s Fox J., Prud'homme (1995), Peterson (1997), Wolman (1990)
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governance. Accountability mechanisms are crucial to elicit responsiveness to public
preferences, and those mechanisms do not necessarily emerge spontaneously from
democratic institutions. Inasmuch as arguments in favor of political decentralization are
numerous, empirical research shows that results in the field are divergent.46 Obviously,
additional factors may or may not make democratic decentralization produce the expected
positive outcome. These complementary conditions are country- and case-specific, and
therefore deserve further empirical research.
The core arguments in favor of autonomous local governments, both the economic
and the political ones, rest on the assumption that local governments are accountable to
their constituents. In many countries, this assumption is manifestly problematic. Several
scholars recently addressed this issue and tried to understand the reasons why
decentralization did not yield its expected benefits. Taking political institutions into
account, they analyze the interaction and reciprocal influences of managerial and political
settings. In the case of Senegal, Marks concludes, "political rewards for municipal
politicians are not linked to governance results," and the main reason why
decentralization did not yield its expected benefits is, "that political decentralization has
not accompanied administrative decentralization." 47 He argues for a better integration of
political analysis into conventional administrative and fiscal analysis, and for the building
of mechanisms that explicitly link political accountability with concrete realizations.
Complementary to these approaches that aim at explaining why decentralization may not
fulfill its expectations, I studied a case where some of them, indeed, have been achieved.
Aboisso is a case where urban governance has been remarkably improved in the past
46 Marks (1996) analyzed in depth the reasons why decentralization did not improve local governance in
Senegal, despite the real autonomy - fiscal, political and administrative - of the Senegalese communes. He
highlights the characteristics of the political system, which as a whole lacks appropriate institutional
incentives for good governance and electoral sanctions. R. Crook and J. Manor studied and compared four
Asian and African Experiences (C6te d'Ivoire, Ghana, Bengladesh and Karnataka, India) and suggest that
the factors that made the difference between more or less successful experiences were accountability
mechanisms, created though particular linkages established between the local governments and their
populations. Crook's detailed analysis of the Ivoirian case points out the absence of these linkages between
the commune and their constituents, as well as the weakness of the civil society and the lack of financial
means. See also Heller, P, (1997) for the case of Kerala in India, and Fox (1991) for the case of Mexico.
41 Marks (1996)
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seven years, in parallel with the decentralization process. Conforming Marks's hypothesis,
I found out that political and managerial48 factors of success go hand in hand.
An example representative of the interconnectedness of political and managerial
factors is shown by the setting of clear political priorities as a result of the scarcity of
resources. The incremental approach was an important ingredient for the success, not only
because it focused the weak existing capacities on the tackling of one problem at a time,
but also because it enabled a learning-by-doing process that eventually increased the
capacity of the local administration. This incremental approach was directly the result of
the lack of financial resources, which forced the municipality to start with an affordable
first phase, and to set clear priorities.
To achieve a remarkable improvement in a period of particularly scarce resources is
striking, and suggests some lessons for donors' assistance. Donors' assistance is often
based on the assumption that the main causes for bad service delivery are the lack of
financial means and local capacity. However, this case suggests that the lack of financial
means is perhaps not such an insurmountable handicap, at least at the time of initiating a
program. Perhaps international donors should look for local small initiatives and help
them to develop over time. Moreover, it may be important for the local administration to
start with projects adapted to the existing capacity, precisely to give time for the learning
process to take place.
Irrelevance of the dichotomy supply-driven vs. demand-driven programs
The unanimous encouragement of community involvement in the literature on
service delivery has led to the dominance of the concept of the 'demand-driven'
program. 49 In the same vein, in C-te d'Ivoire, the financial crisis of the late eighties led to
new institutional arrangements whereby the population is more actively involved in the
delivery of collective services. However, this approach tends to neglect the key question
of the sources of demand, which is taken as a given. It is implicitly assumed that
48 I use the term managerial to refer to both the administrative and the fiscal factors, and to allude to the
'Urban Management Approach,' which dissociates technical and practical aspects of urban governance from
the political ones.
49 Howe and Dixon (1993), Glaessner (1995), Whittington (1993, 1996), World Bank Development Report
1994.
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communities know what they want, and that what they want is what they really need.
Some authors go even further and consider that the willingness to pay is the best
mechanism for eliciting and evaluating demand.so Without contesting the importance of
community involvement or cost recovery, the case of Aboisso suggests that the role of
supply side is underestimated, as well as its political underpinnings
Despite its crucial importance for public health, sanitation is an issue that generally
does not interest the communities, which are often unaware of its benefits.51 Sanitation
programs suffer from this lack of popular concern. In Aboisso, the successful
implementation of such a program results from a long process whereby the supplier (the
municipality) forged a demand within communities. An interactive process allowed the
electoral candidate to disseminate a message around sanitation and elicit popular
expectations, which in turn influenced the setting of his priorities. This popular
mobilization undeniably contributed to the effective and sustained delivery of the
services. The interesting point here is not only that the demand arose, but that it was
developed by the supplier itself. The candidate-mayor literally forged the demand and the
municipal department reinforced it. The supply-driven vs. demand-driven dichotomy is
thus too stark to understanding what happened in Aboisso. This case suggests that
demand and supply are intricately linked, and that service delivery programs ought to be
designed and implemented with the knowledge that the demand can -- and in some cases
should -- be generated by the supply side
A First Step Towards an Accountability Mechanism
The newly elected municipal team delivered successfully and was reelected on the
basis of its good performance. The local administration overcame its initial lack of
technical and financial capacity because political priorities were clear. The municipal
council was reelected because it responded to the popular expectations created during the
50 See Kycong Ae, Whittington and Lauria (1996); UNDP (1990); Winpenny (1994); Cleaver and Lomas
(1996).
5 For a discussion of sanitation programs in general, see Whittington (1996). As part of their research
program mentioned above ("Enhancing Participation and Institutional Performance"), Crook and Manor
conducted a survery on public preferences. In C6te d'Ivoire, this survey shows that sanitation is not among
the top-ten preferred services for men, and is only listed in the 8th position for women.
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electoral campaign. It was capable of achieving this result partly because linkages had
been established between the municipality and the communities. These linkages are the
mechanism by which the municipality informs communities about its actions and by
which it obtains their active participation in concrete activities. By-products of the
electoral campaign, these linkages are a first step towards citizens' participation in the
management of public services, and may be developed over time into institutionalized
mechanisms of accountability.
Political decentralization and multi-partyism created opportunities for politicians to
be legitimized by popular vote, instead of being designated by the ruling party. This
process enabled the emergence of a new kind of political leader who did not want to play
the game imposed by the single party. 52 Aboisso illustrates a case where, indeed, this shift
in the source of power led to the emergence of a more entrepreneurial personality. As an
outsider, the future mayor decided to differentiate himself from the established politicians
by basing his electoral campaign on concrete actions, rooted in the perceived needs of the
population. His search for electoral support led him to mobilize people around the issue
of sanitation, and to reactivate civic associations to support the implementation of this
program. Hence, Aboisso is also a successful case of building popular support for a
collective good.
Civil society is considered to be weak in COte d'Ivoire after thirty years of an
authoritarian regime.5 3 More generally, a negative outcome of the single-party in Africa
was that it prevented any form of autonomous organization within civil society.54 The
state had rightly interpreted community activism in potentially political terms. The
conception of the 'welfare state,' inherited from the French influence, reinforced the
passivity of the population in the provision of collective services. Surprisingly, in
Aboisso, the mayor is at the source of reactivating civil associations. He mobilized people
initially for electoral purposes, but local associations played a role in the implementation
52 This positive outcome of the recent political reforms is acknowledged by most of the analysts. See in
particular Bakary (1986) and Faurd (1991). Along the same line, Marks points out that decentralization led
in Senegal to competitive politics (within the single party) at the local level, thereby favoring the emergence
of 'more-managerially-inclined opponents.' Marks (1996).
53 R. Crook (1990, 1991). The daily Ivoirian Newspaper 'Fraternit6 Matin' conducted a survey of mayors
and local officials: apathy and lack of participation were identified as a common complaint countrywide.
5 J.-F. Bayart (1986).
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phase of the program.5 5 They remain important as the institutionalized linkages between
the population and the municipality. This functional role contributes to their sustainability
over time.
Today, Aboisso is undeniably a case of popular mobilization, as opposed to an
example of real participation of the citizens in public affairs. 56 Nevertheless, there are
now linkages through which communities are informed about the actions of the
municipality, and through which the municipality mobilizes people for concrete activities.
This process has been sustained for the past seven years. "He keeps his words," reflects
the image that the population has of its mayor. His electoral promises became concrete
realizations, and led to his reelection five years later. The linkages between the Aboisso
municipality and its constituents are an embryo of an accountability mechanism. With
political rewards for municipal politicians linked to governance results, the case of
Aboisso shows a possible first step towards 'the difficult transition from clientelism to
citizenship.' 57
5 The authors suggest that this top-down mobilization process may be a first step leading to the 'de-
patrimonialization of the public sphere,' then to 'the adoption of a shared notion of the public interest.'
Mobilization ultimately favors 'the emergence of a new generation of notables and politicians carrying an
ethic of the public interest.' See Jaglin and Dubresson (1993).
56 Following Jaglin and Dubresson (1993), I am making a distinction between popular mobilization, viewed
as 'the use of existing resources' including local human resources, and popular participation, viewed as 'the
process by which citizens participate in the public affairs, including the policy-making process. These
authors point out that what is called participation is often barely more than the mobilization of the
opulation, a strategy aimed at their eventual 'fiscalization.'
7 I am borrowing the expression from Fox (1991).
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Annex 1: Budget of the municipality, 1990-1997
Sources: Direction Generale des Collectivites Territoriales, Ministere de l'Interieur.
Numbers are given in 1.000 CFA
1 USD = 560 CFA
In January 1995, the Ivoirian currency, the CFA, devalued by 50% with respect to the French Franc.
Revenues _ Expenses
National Other Local Total local European Total Budget of Investments Inv. in
Grant intergvt Revenues revenues Grants Revenues Technical Sanitation
transfer Dpt
1990 117,558 115,297 42,344 275,199 0 275,199 59,368 119,915 21,000
1991 43,168 41,323 50,837 135,328 0 135,328 44,752 33,832 26,550
1992 38,852 53,374 60,041 152,267 0 152,267 50,759 46,198 37,698
1993 33,070 94,300 53,002 180,372 5,843 186,215 48,691 73,530 61,893
1994 43,768 59,199 60,009 162,976 64,000 226,976 49,396 118,000 666,000
1995
1996 43,768 180,091 69,258 293,117 149,259 442,376 39,960 210,783 94,381
1997 44,335 128,216 108,991 281,542 176,560 458,102 68,730 258,950 105,425

Annex 2: List of Interviews
Interview were conducted during my stay in the C6te d'Ivoire, in July and August 1997
Municipality
Etch6 Eilleighand, Mayor 1990-1997
Bild' Manlan, First adjoint au Maire
Seydou Gueye, Adjoint au Maire
Bosso Koutoua, Head of the municipal cabinet
Several Municipal councillors
Municipal Administration
Mr. Coulibaly, Head of the municipal administration
Francis Aka, Directeur du Service technique
Francis Vonga, adjoint au directeur
Bidbrou, Responsible for the sewers cleaning and for the sweeping
Auguste, Responsible for the garbage collection
Syedou, gardener
Albert, market cleaner
Salif, truck driver
Marcellin, Agent d'hygiene
Clement, Agent d'hygiene
Ezoua, guard of the park
Mr. Dosso, Directeur des Services financiers
Denis Blehoud, responsible for the management of the public market (user fees
collection)
Albert, latrines maintenance
Clement, latrines maintenance
Local Associations and Communities
Mme Ahui, President of a Women Association (UFRA)
Marianne Tour6, seller, Representative of the Women of Quartier T.P.
Allah Tanoh, President of a Women Association (AMOIZE)
Narcisse, Vice-President of the Youths Association (UJCA)
Leandre Kablan, representative for the Youths to the municipality
Koffi Fobah, President of the UJCA
Moussa, sellers of material
Allah, seller of smoked fisch
Marianne, seller of ati6k6
Other sellers
and people in the street, walkers in the park, buyers in the market, inhabitants of my
neighborhood
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Key-Individuals at the local level
Brou Ahui, leader of the opposition, former adjoint au maire (1980-1990)
Desird Aka, political activist of the opposition
Garett Watkins, Peace Corps Volunteer in charge of sanitation
Hope Fang, Peace Corps Volunteer in charge of community development
Melanie, Head of a local micro-credit project
National Level
Anoh Boko, Adjoint au Directeur de la Direction G6ndrale des Collectivites territoriales
Head of the cabinet of the prefet
Mr. Koup6, Directeur de l'urbanisme, based in Aboisso (deconcentrated administration)
Key-Individuals at the national level
Harris Memel-F6te, anthropologist, leader of the FPI (main political parti of the
opposition)
International Donors
Eric Yobou6,
Isaac D6, Urban Development Specialist at the World Bank
Mr. Drevet, responsible of the European Project involved in Aboisso (PDCC)
Theodore N'Dri, technical support to the PDCC municipalities
Akindes, Sociologue, support to the PDCC municipalities
Research Institutes
Tch6 Tch6 N'Guessan, Directeur du CIRES, partner research-institute of the UNDP
research project
Jean-Maris Chevassu, Directeur de l'ORSTOM
Ori Boizo, researcher, specialist in community participation
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